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Some Questions and Answers Concerning
Justice Blackmun in Federalism and
Separation of Powers Cases
by VrKciAM DAVID AMAR*
Like the other presenters, I remember pretty vividly my first con-
versation with Mr. Justice Blackmun when he interviewed me in his
office in February of 1989. He proceeded through his standard list of
questions in that self-effacing way that is Harry Blackmun, and then
he got to the question: how would I feel about working for the man
who authored the Roe v. Wade' decision? I answered, quite reflex-
ively and tritely, that I would of course "be honored" to work for such
a man. It was not until much later, as I began to teach and write about
constitutional law issues, that I really thought carefully and critically
about Roe as constitutional creed. The conclusion I have reached is
that Roe likely arrives at the right and glorious answer, but that the
precise question the Court asked, whether a fundamental due process
right to engage in certain activity exists, may have been the wrong
one. Instead, I would ask, following the ideas of people like Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, do anti-abortion laws treat women and men equally
within the meaning of the Constitution, and is a political process that
generates laws that uniquely burden women problematic? The an-
swer to this question yields a result similar to that reached by the
Court in Roe, but the equal protection question, focusing as it does on
the way political processes work and how women are represented in
them, is entirely different.
When Bill Dodge2 asked me a few months ago whether I would
be willing to contribute a short piece on Justice Blackmun's federalism
and separation of powers decisions to be included in this symposium, I
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; law clerk
to Justice Harry Blackmun, October Term 1989. This essay is a modified version of re-
marks delivered orally at the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly's symposium held on
October 17, 1998, to honor Justice Blackmun's contributions on the occasion of his nineti-
eth birthday.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law, and co-orga-
nizer of the symposium.
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gave the same answer I gave nine years ago: "I would be honored."
Just like my answer in 1989, my answer to Bill was genuine but reflex-
ive in that I had not at the time really given any systematic thought to
the Justice's overall contribution in the federalism and separation of
powers areas. Having now spent a few months thinking about that
topic, I have a reaction that in some ways is the converse of my sense
of Roe. In many important federalism and separation of powers cases,
Justice Blackmun was impressive and thoughtful in asking the right
kinds of questions about the way the political process functions, but
sometimes gave answers that are open to serious question.
L Federalism
Let us begin with federalism and Justice Blackmun's most famous
and important contribution in that area - his authorship of the major-
ity decision in the 5-4 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority3 case, decided in 1985. In Garcia, the Court held that
federalism imposed no bar to the application of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA")-which regulated minimum and overtime
wages-to state and local mass transit employees.4 In so doing, the
Court formally overruled a case decided a decade earlier, National
League of Cities v. Usury.5 In that decision, the Court had said, with
Justice Blackmun concurring in the majority opinion, that federalism
(in particular, limitations inherent in the Commerce Clause) prevents
the national government from enforcing the FLSA against states and
their subdivisions "in areas of traditional governmental functions."6
The meaning of this phrase, of course, proved illusive and inde-
terminate in the lower courts during the almost 10-year reign of Na-
tional League of Cities. Indeed, in jettisoning the "traditional
governmental functions" test, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Garcia
characterized the National League of Cities approach as "unworkable
in practice."7 But Justice Blackmun went on to find the National
League of Cities framework "unsound in principle" as well.8 This is
so, he said, because while the Framers of Constitution admittedly gave
high priority to protecting the states from federal overreaching, they
did so by building into the Constitution political process safeguards
3. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
4. Id. at 555-56.
5. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
6. Id. at 852.
7. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
8. Id.
Fall 19981 FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS CASES 155
sufficient to protect the sovereignty states were to retain.9 As the Jus-
tice emphasized:
[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special
restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in
the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in
discrete [judicially enforceable] limitations on the objects of fed-
eral authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more prop-
erly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limita-
tions on federal power."
I think a political process model may very well be a helpful one,
although by no means the exclusive one, for evaluating federalism is-
sues posed by cases like Garcia. In other words, I believe Justice
Blackmun hit on something when he asked: do state governments en-
joy structural protections that enable them to take care of themselves
and their own interests in the federal legislative process such that a
"searching judicial inquiry" (a Carolene Products" term) is unwar-
ranted? 2 What gives me pause, then, is not so much the question
Garcia asks, but the way the Court answers that question, relying as it
does on the role states play in the selection of both the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the federal government. 3 In particular, I think
of the four most important structural safeguards Justice Blackmun
cited,' 4 one is pretty trivial, one never existed, and two have ceased to
meaningfully exist by 1985.
First, Justice Blackmun points to the "indirect influence" enjoyed
by the state legislatures over the House because Article I, section 2
provides that "Electors [for the House] shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legis-
lature."15 This does not move me very much. To begin with, prescrib-
ing voter qualifications even in 1787 did not give state legislatures that
much power to control those persons whom the qualified voters
elected. In any event, as Pam Karlan' 6 could tell us better than I, 1985
is a little late to talk about broad state powers to determine voter
qualifications, after Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections17 held
9. See id. at 550-51.
10. Id.
11. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
12. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-55.
13. See id.
14. See iL
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2(1); see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
16. Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, and symposium participant.
17. 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
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that voting is a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, the Court points to the fact that each state is entitled to
equal representation in the Senate, and that such equal representation
cannot be deprived, even by constitutional amendment, without the
consent of the State.' 8 This is an important structural provision of the
Constitution; however, it is not one that protects state governments
from any federal incursions, but rather one that gives special protec-
tion to the people of smaller states. Indeed, equal representation in
the Senate does not protect states qua states in any significant way;' it
protects people of some states from the people of others.
Third, Justice Blackmun's opinion points to the power states have
to select the individuals who make up the electoral college in the pres-
idential election setting."° This was an important state power back in
1787. The Framers explicitly rejected a parliamentarian model of gov-
ernment in which the legislature, or its dominant party, selects the
Chief Executive.2' Instead, the President ordinarily was to be selected
by a body independent of Congress, the electoral collegians. 2 Being
able to pick the people who actually get to pick the President is a big
deal. Or at least it was a big deal. Beginning in the 1820s, states be-
gan holding general elections for the presidency.' Over time, most
states enacted laws purporting to legally bind their electoral collegians
to vote for the candidates selected by the state voters in the general
election. 4 And while it is not entirely clear that a state could not
reverse course today and pick electoral collegians who would follow
the instructions of the state legislature rather than those of the people
of the state, I think such a reversal would be difficult as a constitu-
tional matter, and certainly impossible as a political matter. The
scheme we have today, with electoral collegians bound by the results
of states' general elections, is a basic feature of today's "unwritten"
18. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
19. It might be argued that state equality in the Senate does remind people that the
Constitution thinks in terms of states, suggesting that the people should as well. In this
way, equal respect (in the Senate) for states translates into some respect for every state. I
am indebted to Bill Wang for this point, which is more psychological than legal.
20. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
21. See generally Akhil R. Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REv. 113, 124-25 (1995).
22. See id.
23. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REv. 913, 919
(1992) (citing JAMEs W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTIoN: THEORY AND DEVELOP-
MrNT, 103 n.22 (1979)).
24. See id. (citing, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code § 25105 (West 1989) (requiring electors to vote
for candidates of the political party that they represent)).
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Constitution, and appears to have the approval of both the country
and the Supreme Court.' So even if state control over electoral col-
legians was once a meaningful protection from federal incursion, it no
longer is.
The same is true of state legislative election of United States Sen-
ators, the fourth structural mechanism relied on by the Garcia
Court.26 State legislative election of Senators was, in 1787, thought to
be the most important device by which state government could pro-
tect itself from federal domination.27 Of course, the device of legisla-
tive selection of U.S. Senators did not survive the Progressive era, and
was formally abandoned by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment in 1913.1 Thus, it could not count for anything in 1985, when
the Court decided Garcia.
To his credit, Justice Blackmun does acknowledge that time has
brought about change, and he even mentions one change in particular,
the Seventeenth Amendment.29 But the opinion never goes on to re-
ally grapple with the effect of these changes on its political process
theory. Instead, the Court simply says: "Nonetheless, against this
background, we are convinced that the fundamental limitation that
the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect
the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result."3 I
generally have trouble with sentences-and happily Justice Blackmun
has written only a few over the years-where the word "nonetheless"
does the bulk of the work.
One may have argued that the Seventeenth Amendment, the de-
cline of the Electoral College, and cases like Harper all reflect a
changed national attitude about whether states qua states ought to be
protected from federal domination. If indirect election was the states'
greatest protection in 1787, and we have made a conscious decision to
eliminate that device, perhaps that reveals how little we value protec-
25. See id.
26. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985).
27. See generally, Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE LJ.
1111, 1128 (1988).
28. As I have written elsewhere, the Seventeenth Amendment formalized what states
were already doing through devices such as requirements that state legislators to take a
pledge to elect the peoples' choice for U.S. Senate after taking state legislative office. For
more discussion on this device-the so-called "Oregon Plan"-and legislative election
more generally, see Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VMA,. L. REv. 1347, 1354 (1996).
29. Unfortunately, he does not mention the other big changes, such as those in the
operation of the so-called electoral college.
30. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
158 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:153
tion. So too, with the Electoral College and state control over voter
qualifications. The Court never made such arguments, and I am glad
it did not. In fact, the Seventeenth Amendment was enacted for rea-
sons largely unrelated to federalism. 31 The weakening effect it had on
state government vis d vis the federal government went relatively un-
noticed, and certainly was not a desired and intended effect.32 So too,
I think development like Harper and the decline of the electoral col-
lege are more about populism than federalism, but the story there is
more complicated.
If I were to defend the Court's application of a political process
approach in Garcia, I would stress something that Justice Blackmun
mentioned, but did not emphasize. At the end of his theoretical and
historical discussion, Justice Blackmun pointed out that under the
FLSA, the state respondent "faces nothing more than the same mini-
mum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousands of
other employers, public as well as private, have to meet. ' 33 In other
words, the FLSA did not on its face single out states for any special
and inferior treatment. Nor did the FLSA have any disproportion-
ately onerous effect on states relative to similarly-situated private em-
ployers. In equal protection political process theory, there is safety in
generality. Perhaps Justice Blackmun could have made more of that
in this context as well.
If he had, however, he may not have been able to vote the way he
did in another important federalism case decided seven years later,
New York v. United States.34 The majority in that case, over the dis-
sents of Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens, held that Congress
had violated federalism principles by "commandeering" state legisla-
tures, when it required them either to legislate to accomplish federal
waste storage objectives, or be forced to "take title" to radioactive
waste generated by private sources within the state .3  As Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion repeatedly pointed out, the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Act of 1985 imposed obligations on states that
were not imposed on any private or other public entities.36 Thus, un-
like the FLSA at issue in Garcia, the statute in question in New York
singled out states and forced upon them obligations unknown to pri-
vate entities.
31. See Amar, supra note 28, at 1352-55.
32. See id.
33. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
34. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
35. Id. at 176.
36. See idL at 160.
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I am not sure why this lack of generality did not give Justice
Blackmun much pause. Justice White's dissent, which Justice Black-
mun joined, is certainly not unconcerned with issues of political pro-
cess. In fact, the dissent spends considerable time describing its vision
of "how the legislation at issue.., came to be enacted," and how it
was state governments who lobbied the federal government to help
them solve a quintessential NIMBY ("Not In My Back Yard") collec-
tive action problem.37 Had Justice White's dissent stopped there, and
simply explained why the lack of generality in the federal statute was
unproblematic once the statute was viewed in proper context, I may
very well have agreed. But, Justice White, with Justice Blackmun in
tow, did not stop there; he attacked Justice O'Connor's theory on its
face, and not just as applied. Justice White called the distinction
drawn by O'Connor between general and nongeneral laws in this con-
text "illogical" and observed that:
[T]he Court's attempt to carve out a doctrinal distinction for
statutes that purport solely to regulate state activities is espe-
cially unpersuasive after Garcia .... [In subsequent cases we
have characterized Garcia as leaving] primarily to the political
process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of
Congress' Commerce Clause powers.38
I suppose this is where Justices White and Blackmun have failed
to completely convince me. When political process theory is invoked
in the equal protection setting, the Court uses lack of generality to
explain why deference to the political process is not owed in a given
setting. When a law on its face targets noncitizens, for example, a
Carolene Products footnote 4 theory proponent would wonder
whether the concerns of those noncitizens were properly respected in
the legislature.39 At least that is what Justice Blackmun's fine opinion
in the seminal alienage case of Graham v. Richardson4° says. And just
like non-citizens, states qua states cannot-after the Seventeenth
Amendment-really vote for federal legislators. It is not clear to me
why a law singling out states qua states for distinct regulatory treat-
ment should not raise our suspicions, assuming, of course, that we
think robust state governments are worth preserving as an effective
counterbalance to federal authority. This is not to say that nothing
could allay our suspicions, but it seems to me at least that more of an
explanation is required. I am not saying that I realistically fear that
37. Id. at 189-94 (White, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 205 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)).
39. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
40. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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Congress is going to conscript state governments so that they will not
have time to tend to their own business or that citizens will not know
whom to blame when federal programs go bad. Rather, it might be
argued that cases like New York v. United States and United States v.
Printz41 provide good stopping points down any slippery slope.
II. Separation of Powers
Moving from federalism to another great theme of the Constitu-
tion's design, separation of powers, I see a similar pattern in Justice
Blackmun's jurisprudence. The opinions he writes and joins keenly
and insightfully pose important and interesting questions regarding
political processes, but he answers these questions in ways that have
not yet entirely persuaded me. Mistretta v. United States,42 perhaps his
most well-known majority opinion in this area, gives us some insight
into his approach.
In the 1988 Mistretta case, a criminal defendant challenged on
nondelegation and more general separation of powers grounds the
composition of the Federal Sentencing Commission, a group of offi-
cials charged with promulgating the federal sentencing guidelines
since 1984.41 For my purposes today, the precise nature of the separa-
tion of powers challenge made by the defendant and rejected by the
Court is less important than the way Justice Blackmun set out the es-
sential nature of the separation of powers inquiry.
He describes the analysis in terms of the political process - not
the process leading to the enactment of the 1984 Sentencing Reform
Act that created the Commission, but rather the interactive process
between the branches that takes place after the law has gone into ef-
fect. Drawing from earlier cases, he quotes Justice Jackson to remind
us that "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power ... it also contem-
plates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a worka-
ble government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."'  Moving beyond these
generalities, Justice Blackmun goes on to pose specific questions
about how the Sentencing Commission would affect the way the
branches interrelate. He focuses the Court's inquiry on "the extent to
41. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98, 106 (1997) (extending New York to hold that
Brady Handgun Prevention Act's background check requirement on prospective handgun
buyers imposed unconstitutional obligation on state officers to execute federal laws).
42. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
43. See id. at 371.
44. Id. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 'Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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which [a provision of law] prevents the Executive Branch from accom-
plishing its constitutionally assigned functions."4 5 and cautions against
a law that "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the
Judicial Branch."46
Some would call this approach "functionalist," as distinguished
from a "formalist" take on separation of powers. While helpful to a
point, labels like these mean different things to different people, and
can sometimes confuse as much as clarify. In any event, I think the
kind of functionalist questions Justice Blackmun poses, such as how a
particular challenged law will affect the real-life ability of each branch
to discharge its assigned role in the political and judicial processes,
have much practical value. At the very least, we ought not to get so
caught up in asking formalist questions that we lose sight of this
reality.
I think, by the way, that the Court did lose sight of this reality in
last Term's line-item veto case.4 7 I know Malcolm Stewart's48 name
was on the Solicitor General's brief and that he understands the case
better than I, but my sense is that Justice Scalia got it right in his
dissent when he suggested that Justice Stevens' Court majority had
been "faked out" by the title of the Line Item Veto Act itself.49 Ste-
vens' sometimes formalistic opinion pointed out that the text of the
Constitution mentions only one kind of Presidential disapproval of
Congressional bills in Article I, section 7, and the words "line item"
are not attached to this disapproval power.50 What Justice Stevens
never explained is why presidential exercise of so-called "cancella-
tion" authority under the statute, which Stevens says allows the Presi-
dent to unconstitutionally rewrite bills, is any different from a
President deciding to spend no money on a program where Congress
has permissibly delegated to him the discretion to spend between zero
and X dollars on that program. Indeed, the Act required more by way
of presidential explanation before he could exercise cancellation au-
thority than would an act that simply gives the President authority not
to spend. So asking formalistic questions about the meaning of words
like "veto" and "cancellation" makes less sense to me than posing
questions about how a law affects real relationships between the
45. Id. at 383 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)).
46. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)).
47. See Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
48. Assistant solicitor general and participant in this symposium.
49. See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2118.
50. See id. at 2102-08; see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
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branches. As was true in the federalism context, of course, asking the
right political process questions does not always yield the right
answers.
For me, the case that most clearly illustrates the dangers of giving
the wrong answers to functional separation of powers questions is not
Mistretta, where the stakes do not appear big. Instead, we should look
to the infamous blockbuster the year before, Morrison v. Olson,51 in
which Justice Blackmun did not write, but joined the majority opinion.
Morrison, which was quoted extensively by Mistretta a year later, re-
jected a challenge to the Independent Counsel Act (the "Act").52 Re-
call two of the important questions Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Mistretta asked: (1) whether a law threatens the institutional integrity
of the Judicial Branch, and (2) whether a legal provision would pre-
vent the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally as-
signed functions. Keep those questions in mind when you think about
the Act as it has been applied: you have judicial branch officers pick-
ing an Independent Counsel with a limitless budget who wields quin-
tessential executive branch powers, yet reports to the Legislative
Branch. You think perhaps this has the potential to throw a monkey
wrench in the ability of the three branches to do their jobs effectively?
You did not need to be a fortune teller in 1988 (the year Morrison
was decided) to see that. Structural features of the Act create the
problems we have observed, all too painfully, over the past few years.
Focus first on how Judge Starr was appointed. After lunching with
Republican senators, a panel of Republican judges crafted by a Re-
publican Chief Justice picks a Republican Independent Counsel from
a previous Republican administration. Does that, to use words from
Mistretta, threaten "the institutional integrity" of the Judicial
Branch?53 Of course it does. But not because the Chief Justice or the
other judges involved are evil or excessively partisan; they merely did
what the act contemplates they would do. Is it surprising that the
Chief Justice turned to judges in whom he has built up confidence
after years of reviewing their decisions? Is it surprising that this panel
of judges, not accustomed to the political task of appointing prosecu-
tors, would turn to politicians for guidance? What did we expect?54
51. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
52. Id. at 659-60.
53. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989).
54. See Akhil Reed Amar, Too Much Independence, THE- S.F. DAmy J., October 7,
1998, at 4.
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Thm now to the mistakes and poor prosecutorial judgment Judge
Starr may have exhibited in the course of his investigation. Again, is
this unexpected? The Act tells judges to pick prosecutors. Is it that
surprising that judges might pick a fellow judge with no prosecutorial
experience? Is it surprising that someone with this background might
make some rookie mistakes? Moreover, because the Independent
Counsel is independent, his mistakes do not reflect on those who se-
lected him in the same way that mistakes by an Attorney General's
underlings would reflect upon her. Because there is no accountability,
the appointing court does not have the incentives to think through its
decision as carefully.55
Finally, consider the zeal and determination with which Judge
Starr has pursued his presidential target, lurching from one supposed
scandal to another. Is that surprising? After all, the Act effectively
designates Starr as President Clinton's personal prosecutor. Unlike
regular prosecutors, who are informed of a crime and then try to find
and prosecute a perpetrator, Judge Starr was told, "Here is the man,
now go find his crime, no matter how large or small. And by the way,
money is no object." Combine this with a press and a public that
measures prosecutorial success by the number of indictments and con-
victions rather than exonerations, and you have a heck of a set of in-
centives. Do you think that this constitutional monstrosity might be
preventing the Executive Branch from "accomplishing its constitu-
tionally assigned functions?"5 6
So even though in Morrison and Mistretta the Court may have
asked some of the important questions about how the laws in question
affect the political interaction of the branches, I have my doubts about
whether the Court (including Justice Blackmun) thought carefully
enough about the answers.57
55. For further developments of these points, see id.
56. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 658.
57. I have similar views about another important separation of powers case decided
after Justice Blackmun's retirement, Clinton v. Jones, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (1997). There too, it
seems, the Court misread the way a real-world process-this time litigation-works when
the President is a party.
In particular, as former Solicitor General Walter Dellinger succinctly pointed out to
me in a conversation, ordinarily one can expect the market "value" of a case to place an
upper limit on how many resources a plaintiff is willing to expend investigating. But when
non-parties gain a great deal by bringing a President defendant to his knees, this market-
based limitation dissolves, and civil litigation can become boundless.
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1H. Conclusion
At the end of the day, when I reflect back on Justice Blackmun's
voice and his votes in these important federalism and separation of
powers cases, I am not sure that he answered the important and inter-
esting questions he posed in the same way I would. But I am also not
entirely sure that he would answer all of them the same way today as
he did when he decided them. For one hallmark of Justice Black-
mun's jurisprudence, here and elsewhere, is an intellectual open-
mindedness and a willingness to reconsider questions in light of expe-
rience and new information. I am not at all suggesting that Justice
Blackmun's jurisprudence lacked stability; in many areas, such as the
free speech cases Bill Dodge is going to talk about, there was very
little movement.5" But stability should not be mistaken for rigidity.
Justice Blackmun, while a habitual man, is also an open-minded man.
He showed that in the Garcia case, for it was he who moved away
from his earlier support of the National League of Cities approach to
create the Garcia majority. And he showed it again in the capital pun-
ishment line of cases on which Malcolm Stewart is going to com-
ment.59 (By the way, I think it is noteworthy that his ultimate
conclusion that capital punishment in America today is unconstitu-
tional was based on a discomfort not so much with the penalty itself,
but rather the process by which the penalty is decided upon.) In any
event, Justice Blackmun's intellectual honesty and open-mindedness
are two reasons why I could not be more sincere when I say it was the
biggest honor of my life to be able to work for him, and it is an honor
to be able to celebrate his wonderful contributions today.
58. William S. Dodge, Weighing the Listener's Interests: Justice Blackmun's Commer-
cial Speech and Public Forum Opinions, 26 HASTINGS CON T. L.Q. 265 (1998).
59. Malcolm L. Stewart, Justice Blackmun's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 26
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271 (1998).
